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The milk quotas were introduced in Italy in 1984; from that time onward, the dairy chain  has  progressed in 
technology and organization with consequences for the market competition. The Aglink-Cosimo simulations 
suggest milk production will return to an increasing path, driven by a fairly optimistic demand outlook for 
the improved macroeconomic 2020 future prospects in the EU-27 economies and milk production will 
exceed the present level by about 3%. Milk deliveries would be expected to increase in Italy by a slightly 
higher rate, according with the consumption trend of dairy products. Purpose of this paper is to analyze the 
consequences of structural adjustments of the dairy chain for the competitive price setting assuming the 
retailers and processors having the control on the market prices, causing changes on the welfare 
distribution. The analysis is based on derived demand and price-transmission equations, using a successive 
oligopoly model. The conjectural hypothesis about the players provides the framework for estimating the 
degrees of price transmission in a dynamic setting with agents at the industry and retail levels (rather than 
firm) are acting as two oligopoly players. The conjectures about the oligopoly depending on the structure 
(number of competitors, size and degree of collusion), across the vertical stages of the dairy chain allow to 
simulate different degrees of market imperfection  reflected on the price transmission and welfare 
distribution. (Dhar and Cotterill, 2000; McCorriston and Scheldon, 96; Morgan and Rayner, 1988). Six 
simulations for price transmission and ten simulations for welfare distribution are performed assuming 
different collusive patterns and results are used to check for the market efficiency hypothesis.  1 
 




With the CAP health check the milk quotas are increased by 1% a year from 2009/10 to 2013/14 
campaigns; after this soft landing period, the quota system should be ban at 2015. Measures to 
drive the restructuring of the dairy sector in Italy are tied in with this opening. They have been 
defined as one of the rural development priorities and then will benefit from additional  
modulation measures. In December 2012 the Commission passed to the second step by fixing the 
conditions for a smooth phasing out of the milk quota system, as requested by the Council as part 
of the 2008 CAP Health Check. The “Milk Package” is drafted on the basis of the conclusions of a 
special High Level group set up after the 2009 milk market crisis, this series of measures is aimed 
at boosting the position of dairy producers and preparing the sector for a more competitive and 
and sustainable market with less restrictions. The new regulation  published on 30 March 2012, 
the elements on producer organizations, inter-branch organizations and the delegation of powers 
to the Commission is active since  April 2nd,  while all other elements became effective 6 months 
later. The milk package provides for written contracts between milk producers and processors to 
negotiate contract terms collectively via producer organizations and new specific EU rules for 
inter-branch organizations, allowing actors in the dairy supply chain to dialogue and carry out 
certain activities. This paper is devoted to examine the dairy chain situation in Italy characterized 
by a large number of dairy farm with size constrained by market quotas facing a concentrated 
                                                 
1 This research was made with the contribution of the Region Friuli Venezia Giulia Law 26/05/2008 
Franco Rosa and Michela Vasciaveo 
 
276 
processing industry and even a more concentrated distribution. The evidences of changes in the 
structure with mergers and acquisitions operations contribute to the advance in market 
concentration: Granarolo the first dairy group is continuing to grow its business,  Parmalat merged 
recently with the Lactalis group becoming one of the largest dairy group in the world; in Denmark 
and Netherland the 80% of the dairy business is already concentrated in few cooperative groups. 
Although the concentration is progressing the empirical evidence on the extent of the actual 
exercise of manufacturer and retailer market power in EU dairy chain is under discussion. Surveys 
of the recent empirical work by Sexton (2000), Sexton and Lavoie (2001), and Sheldon and Sperling 
(2003) provide evidence of modest departures from perfect competition; others argued that the 
downstream imperfect competition was a key explanation for asymmetric price transmission 
through the marketing chain, (Miller and Hayenga, 2001) and noticed that  in most cases, this 
claim was made with little theoretical underpinning. McCorriston, Morgan and Rayner (1998, 
2001) have addressed the issue of incomplete pass-through of commodity prices through various 
market levels.  Dosi et al. (1994) using the background of organizational economics, defined the 
importance of four factors contributing to strengthen the role of conduct within the chain: 
complementary assets, enterprise learning, technological opportunities, and selection; however, 
the complementary assets is  the most important one in explaining the distribution of power along 
the chain. Complementary assets lay upstream or downstream "from product-process 
development in the value added chain and generate path dependencies affecting the behavior of 
the agents. Williamson's concept of idiosyncratic assets and their impact on organizational design 
is broadened by the introduction of irreversibility and dependencies. Enterprise learning is the 
most important factor to improve their performance: cumulated  knowledge and concerns 
organizational skills rather than individual skills give to the firms placed at different levels of the 
chain the opportunity to exploit better the complementary assets by coordinating their activities. 
Moreover, the choice of new agreements along the chain will be dependent on the emerge of 
complementarities: "firms can be thought of as an integrated cluster of core competencies and 
supporting complementary assets. The relationships between learning, path dependencies, 
opportunities, inherited complementary assets, and selection allows to distinguish six forms of 
corporate coherence: specialist firms, vertically integrated firms, coherent diversifiers, 
conglomerates, network firms, and hollow corporations. The vertically integrated firms, for 
instance, are characterized by "slow learning but high path dependencies and specialized assets; 
older firms are likely to be more vertically integrated than young firms because start-ups are less 
common in industries where learning is slow" (Dosi et al.,1994). Then the producers operate in the 
dairy chain as integrated cluster of core competencies and adopting organizational models of   
complementary assets. Researchers from the London Economics (2003), after investigating the links 
between retail and farm-gate milk prices in the UK, Denmark, France and Germany, found that in 
the UK, a unit increase in the retail price of liquid milk was fully transmitted to the farm gate price, 
whereas a unit increase in farm gate prices resulted in only a 0.56 unit increase of retail price and 
a unit decrease in farm gate price was transmitted at the retail  by only 0.71 %. In Germany, the 
study also provided two-way price transmission, though rather imperfect, in Denmark, there was 
no evidence of price transmission in any direction, in France, farm-gate price changes were 
imperfectly, transmitted to retail prices.  
For the scope of this analysis the new industrial organization scheme using the complementary 
asset theory and conjectural hypothesis is used to frame the oligopoly model and to analyze the 
consequences for the performance of the dairy chain. (Bresnahan, 1989; Carlton and Perloff, 1997; 
Hudson et al, 1991). Then, the  structure of the dairy  chain is examined at the three levels:  
1 –farm level:  the structure is observed from:  
       (a) the  milk output allocated among  herds of different sizes;  
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       (b) the dairy farm specialization indicated by the breakdown of herds according to whether  
            they are located on farms specialized in milk production or on farms with diversified  
            portfolio of production activities; 
        c) the share of the total milk output produced by the largest dairy farms;  
        d) the geographical distribution and regional concentration of milk production in Italy  
 2 – at the processing level, the quantity  of milk processed by major processors; 
 3 – at the retail level, the quantity of milk delivered by major retailers.  
 The hypothesis is that the degree of concentration and some agreements among players in the 
dairy chain affect the performance by introducing some forms of collusive conducts and reactions 
affecting the pass through of prices with implications for the welfare distribution.  
The paper is organized as it follows: i) the first part describes the trend and features of the dairy 
chain in Italy; the second part describes the methodology of price transmission, assuming 
imperfect pass through of prices; the third part describes the change in consumer’s surplus with 
simulation of some market  conditions and the fourth part reports the conclusion under the new 
dairy policy.  
 
2 Evidence of  structural changes in the EU Dairy sector   
Over the last decades the European dairy farm sector has changed consistently: since the 
introduction of the milk quotas in 1983 the number of dairy farms in EU – 9 has declined, while the 
average size of a dairy farm increased substantially (see table 1). The strongest decline in the 
number of dairy farms occurred in Italy with -80% and a corresponding production increase 
estimated to + 254%;  in Denmark the number of farms declined by -78% and the production 
increased by +165%; in  France the reduction of dairy farms was -73% and the production 
increased + 160%.; in Germany the increase in production was +158% and in Ireland +135%.  The 
dairy farm sizes  in UK and the Netherlands were already the biggest in the EU-9 when the milk 
quota were introduced. For the all member states together the number of dairy farms declined by 
72% in most countries the dairy cow herd decreased by 40 to 45% over this period. The 
restructuring of the sector is signaled by the decline of total number of enterprises in the EU 
during the period between 2003 and 2009; this decline  was the biggest in Italy,  UK and France 
and in some Member States also the average milk processed per enterprise decreased and fewer 
enterprises remained in business (Austria and France). In other Member States, namely Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia, the number of enterprises increased, but on 
average the enterprises processed less milk. The specialization in processing involved the EU-12 
Member States; however  in the Netherlands and in Sweden, where the processing industry was 
already highly consolidated, the number of enterprises increased between 2003 and 2009 but the 
average quantity of processed milk per firm decreased. In the Netherlands or Germany, dairy 
groups are making large scale international alliances to gain competitive power outside the EU.  
In the EU economic literature it is broadly discussed the topic of scale economies (decline of 
average cost per unit of product for herd sizes of 60-80 cows. To a larger extent, this is due to the 
increase in labor productivity and, to a lesser extent, to fixed capital structures. Thereafter, with 
further scale expansion, unit costs fall much more slowly. Structural changes leading to fewer, 
larger herds and to a larger share of sectorial milk output being produced by the larger herds 
lower the average production cost across the sector, and improve the economic performance of 
larger dairy farmers. The structural changes in Italy are accompanied by concentration, 
specialization and localization of milk production in some specific  areas similarly to other regions 
of the EU. In the following table it is illustrated the size of the of the milk production with some 
indexes clearing the features of the concentration of dairy farms.  
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Table 1. Structural variables of the dairy farm in Italy: situation at 2010 
Variables Size of the herds:  number of cows per farm 
      1-9   10-19    20-29 30-39 40-49 50-69 70-99 100-149   >150
% of dairy farms 32,00 18,70 10,90 9,50 6,10 7,20 5,60 4,80 5,30
% of milk produced 2,90 4,90 5,60 7,10 6,00 11,00 11,90 15,90 34,70
nr of cows 6,50 14,60 24,60 34,40 45,00 60,30 83,70 124,10 251,20
yield (t/cow) 4,20 4,91 5,55 5,66 6,16 6,85 6,71 7,16 7,05
milk produced per dairy farm (ton) 27,00 72,00 136,00 195,00 277,00 413,00 562,00 889,00 1772,00
nr cow per Ha 0,80 1,00 0,90 1,30 1,80 1,70 1,60 2,70 3,90
hour labor/cow) 61,10 32,30 23,00 16,40 12,40 10,00 8,40 6,60 4,50  
Source – Il mondo del latte 2011 p 132 
 
The asymmetric distribution of dairy farm can be observed from table 1, by examining the two 
extremes of distribution: at the lower production level (herd 1-9),  the 32% of dairy farm produced 
only the 3% of total milk production; the merge of the herds size 1-9 and 10-19 heads, represents 
the 51% of dairy farms but less than the 8% of the total production;  at the other side of the 
distribution, the 5,3% of  major herd  (>  150 heads) cover the 35% of the total milk production 
while the 10% of dairy farms with herd  greater than 100 heads covered the 50% of total 
production. The concentration measured with the Gini index is equal to 0,65 (zero means signals 
perfect distribution and one signals the total production realized in one plant); the  Herfindal index 
value equal to 1870.  The scale economies offer the empirical evidence of the relation between 
average cost and size; by using the log transformation data the following equation has been 
estimated:  
 




Figure 1. Graph of scale economies 
The number in the abscissa indicate the  size of the herd (see tab. 1) and in the vertical axis the average cost 
 
3 Geographic distribution of milk production between and within Member States 
For many decades, the geographical location of the milk production has been driven by the 
compromise between the advantages of proximity to local (liquid) milk markets or processing 
dairy plants and those of comparative advantage. (Burrell, 1990; Mukhtar and Dawson, 1990; 
Alvarez and Arias, 2003.)  With more intensive production systems customary in Europe diffused,  
economies of scale are continuing to expand beyond 1000 cows contributing to the shift of dairy 
farms in some specialized areas, with better agro-climatic conditions, lower competition for land, 
supply of forage and corn, better labor productivity and more convenient costs.  Already in the 
                                                 
2 In parenthesis are reported the SE values for validation of parameters; R2 is the goodness of fit index 
Estimated Actual data error 
92,10 93,98 -1,88 
63,93 67,21 -3,28 
53,95 53,94 0,01 
48,24 45,24 3,00 
44,38 43,20 1,18 
40,33 37,93 2,40 
35,92 35,81 0,11 
31,60 32,32 -0,72 
29,11 31,00 -1,89 
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late 1990s, it was noticed that over half of the EU-15 milk was produced in only ten regions (Eck et 
al., 1996), situated in the agro-climatic zone known as Atlantic (CEAS, 2000) including the Asturias 
and Galicia, Lower Normandy, Brittany, the Netherlands, Lower Saxony, Denmark, Ireland, 
Western England. Another 30% of milk production was displaced in the so-called Continental zone 
(eastern France, central and southern Germany, the southern tip of Sweden, northern Italy, and 
Austria). These two zones enjoy more advantages for the milk production; in Italy four provinces 
of the Lombardia region are close to produce the 50% of the total milk supply for the most 
profitable dairy chains. In recent time, the progresses in the logistic platform with evolution of the 
road networks and refrigerated chains from the dairy parlor to the processing dairy extended to 
the EU has greatly reduced the need of proximity between production to consumption or 
processing poles. The milk quota system has contributed to frozen the production shares, the 
plant concentration and the efficiency among Member States and has inhibited the relocation of 
production within Member States. 
 
 
4 The structure of the dairy chain in Italy  
The dairy farm structure in Italy  consisted in  2010  of 42 thousand farms with  1,8 million cows, 
producing 10,8 million ton, the limit imposed by the quota assigned to Italy; the first collectors 
were 1650 subdivided almost equally between private and cooperatives. At the processing stage 
operated 1524 cheese plants, 578 second level coops and 69  farm processors and at the 
distribution stage operated 552 hypermarkets, 9133 supermarket and 187550 small retail stores, 
(the HO.RE.CA are excluded from this analysis).  The next figure reports the value chain of dairy 
chain at the three levels: the domestic milk production and import amounted to 4730 million €, 
the industrial value was 14810 € and the retail excluding the GO.RE.CA was 24160 million €. 
By assuming the farm value = 100, the value at the industry is 313 and at the distribution is 511, 
these results suggest some considerations about margin distribution along the chain.      
Table 2. Number of enterprises and  quantity of milk processed by dairy firm in some UE countries  in 2003 and 2009   
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Domestic milk production     Semi processed 
4035 2,70% 87 54,50%
       Total  row material Total imported row material 
4730 6,70% 695 37,20%
              Butter          Liquid milk
256 42,70% 608 35,00%
           Yogurt         Other products             Other
794 -0,4 4440 11,80% 3393 13,10%
         UHT milk   DOP Cheese
1040 5,10% 3256 10,10%
        Food milk   Total industrial value           Cheese
2450 3,80% 14810 7,10% 7923 5,60%
      Fresh milk Other cheese
1410 2,90% 4668 2,80%
        Food milk         Food milk
2536 -4,60% 1160 16,00%
  DOP Cheese   DOP Cheese          Cheese
2965 -0,90% 1141 16,00% 3970 -4,80%
Other cheese Other cheese
3481 0,10% 531 12,90%
           Yogurt            Yogurt            Yogurt
774 -10,30% 16 46,50% 1270 -4,50%
              Butter               Butter               Butter
331 -20,40% 92 294,00% 270 -27,00%
            Other             Other             Other
3881 12,60% 150 89,20% 1583 13,10%
   Total retail value     Total export value        Total Horeca
13970 0,90% 1940 23,30% 8250 -0,20%
Total final value of the chain 
24160 2,00%  
Figure 2. The Dairy value chain in Italy (mio euro) 
 
5 The processing stage 
This stage is examined using the data base AIDA that reports the balance data of the Italian firms:  
the dairy sector is examined using a sample including  213 incorporated societies (IS) with a 
turnover of 7,4 billion € and  197 coops with a turnover of 2,9 billion. The total turnover of this 
sample is 10,3 billion and represents  the 69,6% of the total dairy processing turnover in Italy at 
the beginning of 2010. These two groups are split because of different managerial organizations:  
IS are quite different from the Coops with  relevant consequences for the economic and financial 
results. The IS sample includes firms classified in three groups based on the duration of the 
production cycles, collection centers and big short cycle societies:  
1) short term production cycle (fresh milk, yogurt, cream, and others);  
2) medium term production cycle: from few weeks to a maximum of nine months;    
3) long term production cycle (Parmesan, Padano and other hard cheeses);  for these products, 
the     average ripening period is longer than nine months.  
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4) collection centers: intermediate collectors of fresh milk;,  
5) 14 big short cycle groups (7% of total sample) with a total turnover of 4,7 billion,  the 63% of the 
total. The Gini concentration index of the total sample (IS + Coop) is 0,785, signaling a high level of 
concentration with the 10% of the major companies covering the 70% of the  total turnover .    
    
Table 3. Sample 1 –  IS monitored at the  year 2010 
Average period  of Turnover per firm Turnover Nr companies
Type Groups deposit (months) million euro billion euro
1 short production cycle 0-2     1-95 1,7 134
2 medium production cycle  2- 9     1-96 0,8 44
3 long production cycle  > 9     1-30 0,1 10
4 collection centers 0-2     1-38 0,1 11
5 big short cycle                  0-2   101-935 4,7 14  
 
For the purpose of this  research we examine the short cycle IS producing mainly milk (and fresh 
products as yogurt and fresh cheeses) covering  a large share of the consumer’s expenditure in 
milk products. The 134 short cycle IS represent in number the 63% of the total IS sample; by 
adding the turnover of the big short cycle IS, the turnover increased to 6,4 billion euros, that is the 
86% of the sample and the 44,4% of the total dairy production. The eight biggest short cycle IS 
with a turnover greater than 100 million euros covered a total turnover of 3,633 billion euros, the 
57% of the short cycle IS sample and the 24,51% of the total dairy sector. The Lorenz curve 
suggests that these 10% of companies covered the 70% of the turnover (Il mondo del latte p. 382) 
and the Gini index value was  0,785. These data let us to hypothesize a presence of an oligopolistic 
control at this stage of the dairy chain. 
 
Table 4. Dairy Firms  at the processing stage 
Companies Roe Roi ROS Turnover Cost = Lerner e %turn/total
(2009)    000 €  T - ROS*T  (P - C)/P
Granarolo 13,8 8 5,8 871791 821227 0,058 17,24 24,00
Parmalat 13,5 13,9 55 819978 368990 0,55 1,82 22,57
Egidio Galbani 1 5,3 6,8 759403 707764 0,068 14,71 20,90
Danone 36,5 22 23,5 490686 375375 0,235 4,26 13,51
Sterilgarda Alimenti 21,3 18 9,4 235400 213272 0,094 10,64 6,48
Alim. Valdinievole 7,8 4,1 2,7 163977 159550 0,027 37,04 4,51
Lat-Bri Latticini Brianza 0,2 2,2 1,6 151307 148886 0,016 62,50 4,16
Centr. del latte di Roma 18,5 15,1 11,1 140287 124715 0,111 9,01 3,86
   Total  T = 3632829   C4 = 80,98
 
The Coop sample is composed by 197 units with a turnover of  2,93 billion euros covers the 20% of 
the total turnover realized by the dairy industry.  
 
Table 5. Sample 2 – 197 Coop Companies year 2009 
 
Average period  of Turnover per firm Total turnover Nr Coops
Type Groups deposit (months) million euro billion euro
1 short cycle 0-2   1-87 0,6 33
2 medium cycle  2- 9   3-60 0,44 37
3 long cycle  > 9  1-51 0,23 31
4 collection centers 0-1  1-41 0,36 90
5 big   133-414 1,3 6  
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The biggest short cycle coops are: Cooperlat, Milkon and Assegnatari soci di Arborea covering  the 
20% of the total coop turnover while the three biggest dairy coop with a turnover of 0,48 billion 
euros cover the 80% of the total turnover  and are  short cycle coops.   
 
Taleb 6. Sample 3 – Results of the coop 
Coops Turnover  Operative margin Oper Marg/Turn  Costs
 (000 euro) (000 euro) (Lerner index) (000 euro)
MiIkon 170760 88974 0,52 81786
Cooperlat 191676 27622 0,14 164054
Assegn. Assoc. Arborea 120196 72200 0,60 47996
 
A summary of the data representing the structure of the dairy chain  is reported here: 
Nr of cheese plants: 1524 
Nr of coops: 578 
Nr of farm processors: 69   
Total turnover of the dairy sector: 14,81 billion € 
 
Sample: 
Short cycle IS (incorporated societies) = 134 + 8; turnover =6,4 billion € 
First 4:quota of total turnover = 81% 
Short cycle Coops = 33, turnover = 0,6 billion € 
First 3: quota of total turnover = 80%       
     
6 The retail stage  
The retail stage is described with reference to the year 2010. The Ismea-ACNielsen collects only 
domestic purchases used for the analysis of the distributive sector; the HO.RE.CA (restaurant, 
catering and industrial use of dairy products) are excluded. The highest quota of the dairy 
products is sold to hyper/supermarket both  representing more than 2/3 of the total purchases of 
milk, butter, yogurt and cheese in the year 2010. The fresh milk expenditure increased by 3,3% at 
hypermarkets and declined by 5,3% at supermarkets; the total milk purchases at hypermarket 
remained almost unchanged and decreased by 7% at supermarket; the milk purchases at 
superette and discount stores were the 13%, a similar quota was detected for traditional retail. 
Despite the growth of the discount stores in recent years, the market quota still remained at 5,3% 
of total milk purchased. The distributive network in Italy consists of 522 hypermarkets and 9133 
supermarkets and 4000 retailers; despite the economic slowdown, the modern distribution 
continues to evolve versus higher level of concentration with regional gaps due to economic and 
geographic differences. The retail sales are higher in the Northern regions; however, the South 
regions are recovering fast in last years with the highest rate of growth was for super and 
hypermarkets (+ 4.7%) sales compared to the national average (2.5%). The development of 
modern distribution (LD) in Italy, has greatly influenced the  consumption habits: the share of  
purchases at super/hyper of the fresh milk is now more than 82% and  the UHT milk is 80% (AC 
Nielsen and Istat reports). The current economic situation has determined the growth of discount 
stores that  increased their sale quota by 9.4% in 2010. The changing structure of the LD, the 
higher competition and the need to reduce the costs have pushed forward the concentration that 
is progressing with internal growth or merger and acquisition operations; the most important is 
now the Centrale italiana composed by Coop, Sigma, and Despar,  (Il mondo del latte, 2011 p. 
310). The size of large distribution has grown with backward integration of retail stores with the 
wholesale distribution that represent an integral part of the modern distribution, especially in the 
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form of  Cash & Carry. Few big brand names dominate the market, most of them are foreign 
brands that operate as well in other EU countries: the top 5 groups cover the 66.8% of the total  
turnover of the national C & C and four  of these largest 5 players operate in retail department 
stores and the only one specialized wholesale it is also the leader of the sector. (Tieri and Gamba, 
2009).  The most important groups operating at retail level are: Carrefour (sales in 2011 more than 
82,8 billion ( 7,2 % of market quota), Metro, 66,7 billion, Auchan, 44,4 billion, Leclerc, 40,6 billlion 
and Rewe, 40,3 billion. The top 4 top groups operating in retail are: Coop (15.3),  Conad (10.6%);  
Selex (8,1% ); Auchan (7,8%); all together they cover the 41,8% of total retail; and the  first 8 




Figure 3. The market quota of the first 10 groups operating  in Italy at retail level 
Source AC Nielsen 2012 
 
The sale concentration of the first three groups are different in the EU area: 34% in Italy (Coop, 
Conad, Selex); 54%  in France (Carrefour, Leclerc and Casino); 53% in Spain (Carrefour, Mercadona 
and Eroded), 61% in Germany  (Edeka, Rewe and Aldi), 61% in UK (Tesco, Asda and Sainsbury's), 
some of these groups as Carrefour, Leclerc operate in many EU countries. 
 
The concentration let us to hypothesize some degree of market control facilitated also by the 
higher fragmentation of the rest of  distribution. A further evidence of the chain control is the 
logistic strategies of the purchasing groups (Centrali d’acquisto) that operate at the industry level 
and control the storage and distribution of dairy products. The competitive position of the 
distribution is illustrated with some indexes elaborated on a sample of 32 commercial groups 
representing the 33,5 of the national turnover.  
 
Figure 4. Purchasing groups concentration:  % of turnover over the total 
Source Nielsen GLC 2012. 
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These groups are managing the delivery contracts with the Great Suppliers but are excluded from 
purchases of branded products. For this reason, the weight of the “Centrali”  do not exceed the 
50% on average, because not all the distribution companies are members of these Groups. 
 This situation suggests that collusion could create conditions for other types of marketing control 
in the LD representing more than the 50% of consumers’ purchases.  
The results of market analysts suggest that the quality of milk is perceived almost standardized 
from the label reporting the milk composition and consumers are now looking for more 
convenient products. The price is the main driver of consumer’s choice, determining the market 
share and positioning of larger groups confirming  the orientation versus the private label and 
discount stores. In the next tables are reported the  domestic purchases of dairy products, at 
different market channels with changes of share respect the previous year. As we expected, LD 
represents the highest quota of expenditure with 75% of fresh milk and 83% of UHT. 
  
Table 7. Italy - Total purchase of dairy products for market channel in 2010. Values are expressed  in euro 
Product              Ipermarket            Supermarket               Superette         Discount Traditional shopping Other shopping          Total Italy
2010 % 10/09 2010 % 10/09 2010 % 10/09 2010 % 10/09 2010 % 10/09 2010 % 10/09 2010 % 10/09
Fresh milk 338,1 3,3 609,4 -5,3 114,8 9,9 45,2 0,4 145,3 -3,5 11,1 0,9 1263,9 -1,4
UHT 424,4 -1 580,9 -8,3 67 19,3 91,4 3,5 38,7 6,9 8,6 -8,7 1211 -3,3
Total milk 762,5 0,9 1190,3 -6.8 181,7 13,2 136,6 2,4 184 -1,5 19,7 -3,5 2474,8 -2,3
Butter 88,5 4,7 119,2 0,2 12,1 -4,3 17,3 14,7 6,8 0,7 2,1 12,6 246 2,6
Total yogurt 582,3 -1,1 719 -6,6 52,6 0,3 84,9 -1,9 38,7 6,9 8,9 12,8 1486,4 -3,6
Total DOP cheese 585,6 7,8 751,6 2 106,5 0,21 161,6 4,4 214,1 2 138,1 2,4 1957,5 4,1
Total industr. Cheese 464,8 4,9 618,7 -3,2 85,4 5 115,4 4,4 110,1 -4,3 71,5 5,8 1465,9 0,7
other cheese 670,8 -8 982,7 -0,6 150,4 1,9 177,5 -9,4 235 0,3 119,3 -6,8 2335,5 0,6
Total cheese 1721,2 4,7 2353 -1,8 342,3 7,1 454,5 -0,6 559,2 -2 328,9 1,4 5758,9 0,8
 
% share of purchases of dairy products for type of market channel 
Product              Ipermarket            Supermarket               Superette         Discount Traditional shopping Other shopping          Total Italy
2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
Fresh milk 25,5 26,8 50,2 48,2 8,1 9,1 3,5 3,6 11,7 11,5 0,9 0,9 100 100
UHT 34,2 35 50,6 48 4,5 5,5 7,1 7,5 2,9 3,2 0,8 0,7 100 100
Total milk 29,8 30,8 50,4 48,1 6,3 7,3 5,3 5,5 7,4 7,4 0,8 0,8 100 100
Butter 35,2 36 49,6 48,5 5,3 4,9 6,3 7 2,8 2,7 0,8 0,9 100 100
Totale yogurt 38,2 39,2 49,9 48,4 3,4 3,5 5,6 5,7 2,3 2,6 0,5 0,6 100 100
Total DOP Cheese 28,9 29,9 39,2 38,4 5,4 5,4 8,2 8,3 11,2 10,9 7,2 7,1 100 100
Total industr. Cheese 30,4 31,7 43,9 42,2 5,6 5,8 7,6 7,9 7,9 7,5 4,6 4,9 100 100
Total cheese 28,8 29,9 41,9 40,9 5,6 5,9 8 7,9 10 9,7 5,7 5,7 100 100
Source Il mondo del latte 2011 tab 11.3 p 314 and 11.5 p 317 
 
The price competition among the market channels is suggested by comparing the price of different 
dairy products assuming the price of hypermarket the reference for the other channels. In table 8,  
the column “hypermarket” reports the prices of the different dairy products in absolute values 
while in the other columns the prices are indicated in % difference with hypermarket prices. The 
supermarkets have prices 4% higher, almost zero is the difference with superette, the lowest 
prices (-33%) are found for the discount channels, in traditional shops prices are 11,4% higher and 
in other shops prices are 2,4% higher. For the fresh milk product, the prices are significant lower at 
hypermarket compared to other channels with the exception for the discount channel.   
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Table 8. Dairy products: % price differences for  market channels * 
            Price differences  % value respect the Iper    
Product hypermarket Supermarket Superette Discount Trad shop Other shop Italy 
  abs value % value % value % value % value % value % value 
Fresh milk 1,19 9,24 15,97 -25,21 22,69 12,61 6,72 
UHT 0,87 3,45 -11,49 -40,23 5,75 -3,45 -3,45 
Total milk 0,99 8,08 7,07 -39,39 31,31 7,07 2,02 
Butter 6,18 6,96 8,41 -35,76 14,40 3,72 0,00 
Totale yogurt 3,68 7,07 0,00 -45,65 7,34 -1,09 -1,36 
Totale formaggi DOP 10,99 -0,18 -0,18 -24,48 3,00 -3,18 -2,55 
Total industrial cheese 8.08 4,58 1,73 -35,02 12,00 8,91 -0,99 
Hard cheese 11,51 0,61 -2,52 -21,37 2,78 -4,78 -2,26 
Fresh cheese 6,87 3,93 5,53 -36,54 18,49 5,68 0,44 
Tender cheese 8,89 3,94 11,25 -32,28 15,64 1,57 -1,01 
Semihard cheese 8,92 -0,45 0,78 -29,04 0,78 -1,68 -3,59 
Total other cheeses 8,75 1,49 -34,29 -29,94 6,17 2,17 -2,06 
Total cheese 8,56 2,34 0,58 -31,31 7,94 4,09 -1,64 
Average 5,98 3,93 0,22 -32,79 11,41 2,43 -0,75 
 
*price at hypermarket are reported  in absolute value  
 
7 The imperfect competition in the dairy market  
As the price of fresh milk passes from 0,30-0,40 €/liter at the production stage to 0,6- 0,8 at 
processing and from 0,9 to 1,5€/ liter to distribution stage, the question is if whether these values 
correspond to the prices determined in a situation of market efficiency. The  structure of the dairy 
chain previously discussed suggests to examine the price at different market levels by using a 
partial equilibrium model to observe  if the price setting at different market levels could be 
affected by the  imperfect market conditions.  
This observation is important twofold: first to formulate an econometric approach to predict the 
prices formation and second to estimate the bias in welfare distribution induced by the prices at 
different market levels. The market power may be analyzed with the multilevel market behavioral 
models by assuming fixed proportion technology, constant marginal cost and linear demand 
through the specification of those elements affecting the competition in the equations of price 
transmission mechanism here reported.  
 
2    C*Pp (1 + (ECp/ep)) + M = Pc (1 +( ECc/ec)) then 
 
3     Pc – M  =  (C*Pp (1 + (ECp/ep)) / (1 +( ECc/ec)) 
 
4     Pc / C*Pp =  (1 + (ECp/ep)) / (1 +( ECc/ec)) + M 
 
5    d Pc / dPp = c*(1 + (ECp/ep)) / (1 +( ECc/ec)) 
 
These equations suggests that the final price at the consumption of the milk product PC, and the 
price of milk at the farm gate PP, are related by a conversion coefficient c, and are bound by the 
processing costs M and possible influence of the oligopoly conduct performed by farmer-
processor and processor-retailer of agricultural commodities (ratio between the conjectural 
elasticity ECP of the dairy farm milk, and supply elasticity of dairy farm milk eP) and the 
oligopolistic behavior for the presence of large dairy chains (formalized with the ratio between the 
conjectural elasticity at retail ECc and the elasticity of final demand eC). The crucial point of this 
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analysis is to determine the extent of the market power, represented essentially by the value of 
the conjectural elasticities ECC and ECP:  the greater the elasticity  different from zero, the higher 
will be the power along the supply chains and the deviation from a regime of perfect competition. 
While these elasticities, under appropriate restrictions, can be approximated by measures of 
industrial concentration, and it is possible to obtain reliable estimates of these parameters from 
the econometric analysis or with Learner index.3 Other authors have discussed the relations 
between vertically related, imperfectly competitive market structures, product differentiation, 
degree of price pass-through, conjectural changes and consumers' welfare variation (Kinnukan and 
Forker, 1987). By using the conjectural variation in the imperfect competitive industry, it is 
possible to generate various degree of market imperfections  signaled by the price transmission 
mechanism4. Also in this approach the authors demonstrate that only a fraction of the price 
change is passed through successive stages affecting the  margins and the consumer’s welfare 
distribution, that is lower compared to the perfect competition. The literature describes different 
approaches to the vertical chain for modeling the market power: some studies focus on the 
wholesale-retail level (Gohin and Guyomard, 2000), others on the farm-processing level (Suzuki 
and Kaiser, 1997) and others consider jointly the processing ⁄ retailing levels (Chidmi et al., 2005). 
By modeling a two stage successive oligopoly, the market power can be elaborated at different 
levels of the vertical chain with n upstream firms processing  products used by m downstream 
firms distributing the final product. Different authors provide a general framework for estimating 
indexes of market power in a dynamic setting when only industry-level (rather than firm) data are 
available. (Mc Corriston and Sheldon, 1996). Perloff et al. (2007, Chapter 7) One has to choose the 
appropriate setting to correctly identify the source of imperfectly competitive behavior modeled 
as a Cournot competition. Specifically it is assumed: fixed proportion production technology, firms 
at both stages operate with constant marginal cost; the downstream (retail) enterprise do not 
exert market power at the intermediate (processing ) stage and the consumer demand is linear. 
(Wu, 1992).  
 
8 Price transmission and  the conjectural model  
The partial competitive equilibrium model of the dairy sector is framed into the domestic contest 
(Italy) with the vertical chain represented by dairy farms, industry (processing) plants and 
distribution (retail) stores with a competitive numeraire one.  
Farm level: the structure of farming activities and the behavior of the producers are modeled 
assuming the profit maximizing behavior. The number of dairy farms and the fragmentation of the 
farm supply do not allow to assume a collusive behavior among producers. Farmers with the 
intervention of their representative associations (Coldiretti, Confagricoltura, CIA, Italatte) could 
only bargain a price close to the marginal production value  of the most  efficient producers.    
b) processing level: at this stage the behavior of agents involved in processing is profit maximizing. 
All these vertical relationships are modeled as a single stage; the interest is in modeling the impact 
on agricultural producers (upstream) and final consumers (downstream), assuming that all the 
vertical relations within this stage will only affect benefits distribution. Possible evidence of 
collusive behavior will be demonstrated along the analysis.  
c) the retail level follows the approach of the processing level and collusion could also be more 
evident for the marketing strategies and product differentiation. The final demand for milk 
                                                 
3 For example, the dairy sector in Italy has been modeled with a partial equilibrium model (Moro, Sckokai and 
Soregaroli, 2006) which includes the effects of market power. 
4 Although criticised on the theoretical ground for its dynamic inconsistency,  the conjectural variation approach has 
been particularly appealing empirically, where conjectures are often interpreted as the result of an unmodelled dynamic 
and imperfectly competitive game ( Bresnahan, 1989) 
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product  is modeled at this stage as a utility maximizing behavior and consumers do not have any 
market power. Since in the processing and retailing stages of the dairy chain there are evidences 
of imperfect competition the model accounts for market power: thus the price transmission 
mechanism will provide more insight for the vertical transmission of shocks, both at the final level 
(i.e. the BSE crisis) and at the farm level (i.e.agricultural policy reform) (see Moro and others, 
2006). Thus we assume a successive oligopoly paradigm, following the approach suggested by Mc 
Corriston and Shieldon, (1996). Ottaviano et al. (see Anichiarico, 2008) suggest that the 
preferences could be modeled by a quasi-linear utility function with a quadratic sub-utility that is 
assumed to be symmetric in all product varieties and identical across individuals defined as it 
follows:  
 
6  U(q) = q0 + aΣ i = 1…n  qi – b/2  Σ i = 1…n qi2    -  g/2  Σ i = 1…n  Σ j ≠ i qi qj 
 
qi is the quantity of product variety i = 1..N and q0 is the quantity of the numeraire good. 5  
All parameters are assumed to be positive. In particular the condition b > g > 0, imply that 
consumers pay attention to the  variety and these assumptions ensure that U is strictly concave. 
The parameter g measures the degree of substitution between varieties so that goods are 
substitutes, independent or complements according to whether g >, = , < 0. The larger is g, the 
closer substitutes goods are; if  b = g  the goods are perfect substitutes and equation (1) becomes 
a standard quadratic utility defined over a homogenous product. By reducing the n product to 
one, namely the fresh milk, the consumer behavior can be modeled with a separable quadratic 
and concave Utility function, linear in the numeraire  having the  following functional form: 
 
7          U(Q2) = aQ2 – b/2*Q22  
 
Q2 is the supply of liquid milk at the consumption stage;  a and b are the parameters of the Utility 
function and the subscript 2 indicate the final stage of the dairy chain. The consumer’s  
optimization is based on the equality between marginal utility dU/(Q2)  and price P2:  
 
8         a – bQ2  =  P2           
 
that is the inverse demand function. The profit of the firm ith operating at the final stage is:   
 
9       Π2i = (P2 – C2i  - αP1 ) q2i   
 
P2 is the price of  milk at the final stage,  P1 is the price of  milk at the processing level, C2i  is the 
marginal constant cost6;  q2i  is the quantity produced by the representative firm I,  is the ratio 
that represent the quantity of  the industry product used to produce one unit (1 liter) of fresh milk 
to consumption. Ignoring the subscript i, the profit maximizing condition for the representative 
firm is:   
 
10      d Π2 / dq2 =   (P2 – C2  - αP1 ) + q2 ( dP2/ dq2)   =  0         
 
Assuming n2 symmetric firms at stage 2 and aggregating the above condition we obtain: 
                                                 
5 The use of a quasi-linear utility function leads to a partial equilibrium analysis, in that the  income effect on the 
demand for differentiated goods is completely neglected. At the same time, the numeraire good can be seen as a 
composite good, formed by the rest of the goods produced in the economy, which captures all the variations in income 
level. See Vives (1999) and Ottaviano et al. (2002) for details. 
6 At given condition marginal cost is assumed to be equivalent to average cost  




11      (P2 – C2i  - αP1 ) – Q2D2  =  0   
 
D2 incorporates the slope of demand function ( negative dP2/ dq2i) and the strategic interaction 
among the n2 firms with conjectural variation term for a representative firm having the form: 
 
12      D2 = b/n2 (1 + (n2 – 1)) V2 
 
The conjectural variation term V2 is what the representative firm expects about the rival reaction 
to his own change in supply at retail level7. In the repeated game played by a firm, the outcome 
will depend on the type of conduct ranging from competitive to collusive behavior depending on 
the interaction among firms. Then three situations are possible:  
i) collusive conduct: the behavior of the firms is similar to a monopoly the value of Vi (i =1 for 
processing and 2 for retail) will approximate to 1, and the price formation will follow the 
monopolistic model; 
ii) perfect competition: (Bertrand), the value of Vi will be Vi = -1/(ni – 1), the  firms are price takers 
with no effect on market price;  
iii) Cournot Nash behavior: the rivals do not react to the change in supply of the representative 
firm then the value of Vi will be: Vi = 0.  
 
With substitution of the value of Q2 in the inverse demand 7 into 10 we obtain: 
 
13      P2 = ( b /(b + D2) ) (αP1 + C2 + a/b D2 )          
 
 
By substituting the value P2 from equation (7) into equation  (10) and expressing the value of Q2 
in terms of Q1 the derived inverse demand function for milk at industry is:     
14       P1 = (a – C2) / α – ((b + D2) / α2) Q1 
 
The profit of the representative dairy firm at the industry level is:   
 
15       Π 1  =  (P1 – C1  - δP0 ) q1 
 
P0 is the milk price at the farmers level used by industry processor , C1 is the marginal cost of 
production  and  is the ratio that indicates  the amount of farmer’s milk used to produce one unit 
of processed milk. The profit maximizing condition  for representative industry processor is  
 
16       d Π 1 / d q1  =  (P1 – C1  - δP0 ) + q1  (d P1 / d q1) = 0   
 
By aggregating the above conditions over n1 symmetric firms it is obtained: 
     
 17    (P1 – C1  - δP0 ) - Q1D1  = 0    
 
                                                 
7 There are several types of oligopoly. When all firms are of (roughly) equal size, the oligopoly is said to be symmetric; 
when this is not the case, the oligopoly is asymmetric. One typical asymmetric oligopoly is the dominant firm.. The 
analysis of oligopoly behavior normally assumes a symmetric oligopoly, often a duopoly. Whether the oligopoly is 
differentiated or undifferentiated, the critical problem is to determine the way in which the firms act in the face of their 
realized interdependence. 
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The term D1 incorporates the slope of the derived demand of milk at the industry level, and 
strategic interaction  among firms at stage 1 that is the conjectural variations parameters V1 . 
Hence  D1 is: 
 
18    D1 = (b + D2) / n1 α2  * (1 + (N1 – 1) V1)  
 
The calculation of V1 is similar to V2; with substitution of  the value of Q1 from equation (16) into 
derived inversed demand equation 13 we obtain:  
 
19    P1 =    ((a – C2)/ α D1) +  ((b + D2)* (δP0 + C1) / (α2 D1 + b + D2) 
 
From equation (12) and (18)  is elaborated the price transmission equation distribution/farm: 
 
20    dP2/dP0 = dP2/dP1*dP1/dP0  
 
The  two partial derivatives are obtained from equations 12 and 16 are:    
 
                                   20.1  dP2/dP1 = α*b/(b + D2)   
20.2  dP1/dP0 = (b + D2) δ *( α2 D1 + b + D2)    
 
Finally the transmission equation is: 
 
21   dP2/dP0 = (b* α∗ δ) /( α2  D1 + b +D2 
 
And with substitution of  D1 and D2 the final transmission equation is:   
 
22  dP2/dP0 = (α∗ δ * n1* n2) / ((n2 +1) + (n2 -1) V2) *  ((n1 +1) + (n1 -1) V1) 
 
This equation suggests that the  price transmission from farm (Po) to processing (P1) and retail 
levels  (P2) of the dairy chain is a function of the number of firms at the final (retail) and 
processing stages; the degree of market imperfection causing imperfect price pass through is 
consequent to the collusive behavior of firms at these two stages. By assuming α = δ  = 1 meaning 
that one unit of milk at the dairy farm corresponds to one unit of processed milk and one unit of 
processed milk corresponds to one unit of final milk. 8 we can say that, the price transmission will 
depend only by the number of firms operating at different levels and  conjectures about their 
collusion:  V1 for processors and V2 for retailers. The degree of price transmission ranges in theory 
from a minimum  0,25 to a maximum 1, corresponding to  the two extremes of  the behavioral 
models. With  collusion, the Vi’s (i = 1,2) tends to 1 and degree of price transmission will collapse 
to 0,25, with competition Vi tends to  0, the value of price transmission will  approach to 1 and 
firms would behave as predicted by Cournot Nash model. Then the price transmission will 
fluctuate in the range  between 0,25 to 1 depending on the number of firms and their degree of 
collusion; with the increase in the  number of firms, the value of V1 and V2 tend to decrease 
showing higher competition. (Deodhaar and Fletcher, 1998)  
                                                 
Source CRPA and Il Mondo del latte (ref file igls-dairy chain value Italy-1 page 2) 
 
8 The decline of  α and δ  will affect  the  price transmission, the extreme situation is when  α or  δ  approach to 0, in 
this case there will not be a price transmission. In our case  it is  assumed  α = δ = 1 since the quantity of fresh milk 
remains the same through the chain. 




The previous analysis provides the information to evaluate the price transmissions across the dairy 
chain. The values of the fresh milk conversion coefficients   from farm to processor and from 
processor to retailer are assumed to be 1 because fresh milk passes from farm to retail without 
significant losses in volume. The next table reports the main features of the dairy chain  
 
Table 9. Dairy chain in Italy at 2010 
 
Voice Value Description
coefficient α 1 Conversion milk index processing/retail 
coefficient δ 1 Conversion milk index farm/processing
Co (Cost at farm level ) 0,35 Minimum average cost at farm level
C1 (Cost at processing level ) 0,6 Minimum average cost at processing level  
C2 (Cost at retail level ) 0,8 Minimum average cost at retail level 
Po (Price at farm level ) 0,5 Price at farming level  (average 2010)
P1 (Price at processing level ) 0,65 Price at processing level
P2 (Price at retail level ) 1,25 Price at retail level fresh milk
Farm 
nr dairy farms 42000 Total number of dairy farms
Symmetry 2226 Symmetric farms (largest 5,1%)
Lerner index ( Po - Co) / Po 0,3 Lerner index at farm stage
Herfindal index 1870 Squared quota of milk produced by different size dairy farms
Gini index 0,65 Concentration dairy farm 
C4 26% Milk produced by the  4%  of largest dairy farms
 Industry 
nr of firms 2171 Including cheese plants farm coops and farm processing plants
P1- C1 / P1 0,08 Lerner index at processing stage calculated on the first 4 with mediana 
Gini index 0,78 Concentration of production
C4 81%
Retail
n2 9685 Number of symmetric firms at retail stage  (Hyper and supermarkets) 
P2- C2 / P2 0,36 Lerner index at retail 
C4 41,4 Concentration index  first 4 firms 
 
The Gini index at retail level is calculated on a sample of 410 firms  in 2010 of which 213 are IS and 
197 cooperatives (Il mondo del latte, 2011, p. 381) 
The analysis was performed by assuming three concentration levels calculated with respect to the 
total market sales respectively: 1) 40-50%; 2) 60-70%; 3) 71-80%; these values were maintained 
for the three levels of the dairy chain.  These values are reported in the following table.  
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Table 10. Number of firms for  given levels of concentration in the Italian dairy chain 
sector
  Number of enterprises farm production industry turnover retail  turnover 
concentration value: 40-50% turn 50% 44,60% 41,80%
number 
   (abs value) 4083 2 4
   % value 10% 20% 50%
concentration value: 60-70% 60% 67,70 61,7
number  
   (abs value) 6347 3 7
   % value   
concentration value: 71-80% 80% 81% 72%
number 
   (abs value) 11724 4 10
   % value 29 40% 100%  
 
The oligopolistic competition is simulated by assuming the values of V1 and V2,  representing the  
conjectures of the representative firm against its rivals at the level 1 and 2 of the dairy chain. The 
oligopoly condition will depend on the type of agreement among firms ranging from:                          
a) strong collusion among firms, with a monopolistic market condition:  Vi = 1 for i = 1,2;                 
b)  Bertrand behavior: the firms are price takers,  their collusive behavior will not have 
consequences for the market price determination; in this case Vi = -1/(ni -1);                                    c) 
the Cournot Nash behavior:  the rival firms will not react to the output change of the leading  firm; 
the value of Vi = 0. The following table reports six simulation of oligopoly conditions  and 
consequences for the changes in price transmissions. 
In the first successive oligopoly simulation it is assumed that both players strongly collude 
together then V2 =V1 = 1 causing the lowest price transmission that decreases with the increase of 
market concentration: the values range between 0,38 for lower concentration to 0,29 for higher 
concentration. The change in concentration do not cause major changes in pass through values 
since the increase in market concentration is counterbalanced by the higher number of firms 
especially at the processing level that increase the internal reactions. 
For the second simulation it is assumed that at retail level there is a monopoly condition at retail 
and competition at processing level,  then V2 = 1 and V1 = 0; this market asymmetry causes an 
increase in pass through values that range between 0,60 for lower concentration to 0,58 with 
higher concentration. With the third simulation it is assumed a monopoly at retail, V2 = 1 and a 
Bertrand behavior  at processing level (V1 = -1/(n1-1). The pass through value range from 0,75 for 
lower concentration to 0,58 for  higher concentration. With  the fourth simulation, it is assumed a 
monopoly condition at processing level and no power at retail. The pass through values 
correspond to the previous condition. With the fifth simulation it is assumed V1 acting as a 
monopolist and  V2 with Bertrand behavior;  the pass through is passing from 0,83 with 60-70% of 
concentration to 0,70 with 71-80% concentration.       
Finally the sixth simulation assumes both to behave as in almost competitive conditions  causing 
the highest value of price transmission.  
The simulation results confirm the behavioral hypothesis of successive oligopoly that the price 
transmission improves by passing from perfect collusion between processors and distributors  to 
the perfect competition. The results of the price pass through can be used to make the price 
setting along the chain using the margin that is the difference between 0,35, the minimum  cost 
and 0,5, the market price, then m = 0,15. By using the coefficients of price transmission the prices 
at the farm level are estimated and vary in the range between the minimum 0,35 with simulation 
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1, assuming V1 = V2 = 1 and concentration is set to 71-80% and the maximum 0,5 obtained with 
simulation 6 with concentration equal to 40-50% and 71-80%. The average price in Italy is close to 
0,40 cent/liter then the most approximate market structure is the one indicated by simulation 1 
and concentration 40-50%; simulation 2 shows the prices around 0,44, with simulation 3, 4 and 5 
the prices behaves  similarly and simulation 6 shows the highest price transmission. The 
conclusion is that simulation 1 and 6 show the lowest and highest prices while with the other 
market conduct the price differences are   not so relevant.      
  




Concentration   n1 n2 V2 V1 dP2/dPo Po 
      simulation 1         
    40-50% 1 1 4 3 1 1 0,38 0,385 
    60-70% 1 1 8 5 1 1 0,31 0,360 
    71-80% 1 1 142 7 1 1 0,29 0,351 
      simulation 2         
    40-50% 1 1 4 3 1 0 0,60 0,445 
    60-70% 1 1 8 5 1 0 0,56 0,436 
    71-80% 1 1 142 7 1 0 0,58 0,441 
      simulation 3         
    40-50% 1 1 4 3 1 -0,33 0,75 0,471 
    60-70% 1 1 8 5 1 -0,14 0,63 0,450 
    71-80% 1 1 142 7 1 -0,01 0,58 0,442 
      simulation 4         
    40-50% 1 1 4 3 0 1 0,75 0,471 
    60-70% 1 1 8 5 0 1 0,63 0,450 
    71-80% 1 1 142 7 0 1 0,58 0,442 
      simulation 5         
    40-50% 1 1 4 3 -0,50 1     
    60-70% 1 1 8 5 -0,25 1 0,83 0,482 
    71-80% 1 1 142 7 -0,17 1 0,70 0,463 
      simulation 6         
    40-50% 1 1 4 3 0,07 0,07 1,00 0,500 
    60-70% 1 1 8 5 0,07 0,07 0,98 0,498 
    71-80% 1 1 142 7 0,07 0,07 1,00 0,500 
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10 Oligopoly and welfare gain of the consumer 
The effects of oligopoly conducts are also evaluated in terms of welfare change for consumers. 
Using the linear demand function (equation 7) the consumer’s welfare gain is measured with the 
consumers’ surplus (CS) variation that is the area under the retail milk demand that will change 
according with the milk price variation. The price change ∆P from P22 to P21 will determine an 
increase in quantity from Q22 to Q21 corresponding to ∆Q.  
 
 









   Q22 ∆Q Q21      Q2 
Figure 5. Demand at retail and change in consumer’s surplus to price change at farm level   
 
The change in CS  depends on the  price change: 
 
17 -    ∆ CS = ∆P  * Q22 + ∆P * ∆Q/2 = ∆P * (Q22 + ∆Q/2)       
 
By substituting ∆P in ∆P0 from equation 21 and  ∆ Q with the  demand elasticity for  milk at retail 
level  ηd it is derived  the following equation: 
 
 18 -    ∆ CS = Q22 ( 1 + ηd / 2 P22  Ω) Ω 
 
Where  Ω  will measure the change in price transmission due to a change in dairy farm price ∆ P0: 
 
 19 Ω = dP2/dP0* ∆ P0 = (α∗δ  * n1* n2) / ((n2 +1) + (n2 -1) V2) *  ((n1 +1) + (n1 -1) V1) * ∆ P0. 
 
To compute the changes in consumer’s surplus corresponding to a change in farmer’s prices the 
values of the following parameters are required: 
i)   (δ)  quantity of milk at farm converted to one unit of milk at processing level; 
ii)  (α) quantity of milk  at processing level converted to one unit of  milk at retail level;  
iii)  Po value of price at the farm level;   
iv) ∆ P0 absolute change in milk price at farm level; 
v)  n1, n2 number of firms respectively at processing  and retail levels; 
vi) V1, V2 conjectural variations at processing  and retail levels;  
vii) d  milk demand elasticity at retail level;  
viii) reaction equation dP2/dPo to a change in  P0;   
ix) P22, Q22,  price and quantity of milk consumed at retail level 9.   
All these parameter values are drawn from different statistical sources and  used to compute the 
consumer’s surplus in absolute and % changes under different market regimes. (see table 13). 
                                                 
9 In 2010 the total consumption of milk at retail level was 2,87 mln tons of which 1,59 mln UHT and 1,28 mln fresh. Then the price 
at retail is the average between fresh and UHT milk equal to 1,2 €/l.  
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 To check the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to change in parameters we have performed 
ten simulations, the first one is the baseline and is used as the reference for the others; each 
simulation is performed at two concentration levels. The changes in parameter value for each 
simulation are reported in red. The results are summarized as it follows:  
1) With near to monopoly conditions (V2 = V1 = 1) the highest market control by processors and 
retailers, the following CS effects are detected with see simulation 1,2,3: 
• the change in demand elasticity had a limited impact over the consumer’s surplus at both 
concentration levels: passing from 1 to 2 (abs values) the change in CS was only 0,15%;  
• simulations 4,5,6 show that the magnitude of CS changes were considerably higher using 
the price differences at the farm gate: passing from 0,2 (0,35 c/l to 0,33 c/l) to 0,4 (0,35 c/l 
to 0,31 c/l  the CS increased from the baseline respectively 2 and 4 times without 
differences at the two concentration levels;  
• the effects of different conducts on CS change are considered with simulation 7..10. 
simulation 7 assumes control at retail and absence of control at processing level; the CS 
value is 1,6 times the beginning value with concentration at 40-50% and 1,8 times with  
concentration at  60-70%;   
simulation 8 assumes control at retail and Cournot Nash situation at processing level: the 
CS increases 2 times respect the beginning value and concentration has no effect; 
simulation 9 assumes control at processing and no control at retail: the effect are the 
increase of CS of 1,5 times and 1,67 times at the two concentration levels; 
simulation 10 assumes no market power at processing and retail: this has given the best 
CS respectively 2,4 and 2,97 higher respect the beginning at the two concentration level 
and equivalent  Po.    
These results demonstrate that as the degree of market control increases, the consumer’s 
surplus decreases for a given level of price reduction.     
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Table12. Simulation of changes in consumer’s surplus with two level of concentration ( in red the changes of 
parameters) 
Parameter Concentration  = 40-50%
sim. 1 sim. 2 sim. 3 sim. 4 sim. 5 sim. 6 sim. 7 sim. 8 sim. 9 sim. 10
α 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
δ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P0 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35
n1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
n2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
ηd -2 -1,5 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
V1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 -0,3333 1 0
V2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
∆P0 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
Ω 0,0025 0,0025 0,0025 0,005 0,0075 0,01 0,004 0,005 0,00375 0,006
Q22 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87
P22 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20
∆CS 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02
∆CS  index 100,00 99,93 99,85 200,00 300,45 401,20 159,90 200,00 149,89 240,14
Parameter Concentration  = 60-70%
α 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
δ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P0 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35
n1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
n2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
ηd -2 -1,5 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
V1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 -0,1429 1 0
V2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
∆P0 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
Ω 0,0025 0,0025 0,0025 0,0050 0,0075 0,0100 0,0044 0,0050 0,0042 0,0074
Q22 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87 2,87
P22 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20 1,20
∆CS 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02
∆CS  index 100,00 99,93 99,85 200,00 300,45 401,20 177,72 200,00 166,58 296,72                
 
11 Conclusion  
This research  analyzed the dairy chain in Italy using a successive oligopoly model to explain the 
consequences of the dairy chain structure for the conduct and price transmission signaled by the 
value of pass-through across the chain, and welfare distribution. For this research it was used a 
modified version of Mc Corriston and Sheldon model applied to the dairy chain using the prices of 
the fresh milk product. The market competition and price transmission was affected by the 
behavior of operators at different chain levels depending on the number of competitors at 
processing and retail levels and their degree of collusion. For the analysis of the welfare 
distribution more market information were needed: the consumer demand and elasticity, and the 
magnitude of price differences at the farm level; these information were not estimated but 
obtained from many sources. The analysis demonstrated that the degree of price transmission 
along the vertical chain and the consumer’s surplus distribution were both affected by market 
conditions. While demand elasticity had a modest effect on CS changes, the  market power and 
the price changes at farm level were the most important determinants of  welfare distribution. 
The suggestions for the policy analysis are: being the farm prices  important in determining the CS 
change, and farmers having a limited bargaining power to control the prices, due to the great 
heterogeneity of dairy farms, the price support still remain an important political tools, to reduce 
the losses in welfare. In the absence of any intervention a consistent number of producers will 
leave the sector and the dairy chain will continue to concentrate, specialize and localize in some 
specialized areas of the territory with a greater impact on soil and other negative externalities. 
With the scale economy it is possible to predict this change:  for a price below 30 cent/liter only 
the 20% for dairy farms with more than 100 heads will survive to the liberalization of the dairy 
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sector in absence of any intervention 10 At this point it is useful to consider how the formal model 
outlined above might usefully be extended. First, it might reasonably be argued that the model 
has been restrictive for its assumption of a simple fixed proportions technology. For example, 
McCorriston et al. (1998)  have developed a model that allow for both imperfect competition 
downstream, and variable proportions technology in the downstream sector. Interestingly, 
though, their analysis has shown that the marginal impact on pass-through of upstream price 
changes of increasing the elasticity of substitution in a variable-proportions technology has 
significantly decreased as the downstream sector becomes less competitive. Second, the 
downstream technology has been assumed to be one where there are constant marginal costs, yet 
industries defined imperfectly competitive may also have technologies that exhibited increasing 
returns that in the downstream sector offset the effects of imperfect competition downstream on 
pass-through (McCorriston et al. (2001). Third, the successive oligopoly has been  incorporated 
into the model underlying the numerical simulation based upon the assumption of linear inverse 
agricultural supply function, resulting in less than perfect pass-through of changes in the 
agricultural commodity price.  
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